Philosophical Writing

Martin and Deutscher's causal theory holds that genuine remembering requires accurate representation, first-person experience, and a direct causal connection to the original event. This paper argues that these conditions are incomplete. Through nostalgia and rosy retrospection, I show that a memory can satisfy all three conditions while still changing in how the original experience is felt, a shift at the level of autonoetic consciousness that their theory does not address. A complete account of episodic memory must explain not only how memories are causally preserved, but how their subjective character can change over time.

This paper critically evaluates Benjamin Libet’s findings and interpretation of the readiness potential. The readiness potential in the brain is a signal of neural activity before an individual’s conscious awareness of their desire to perform a free motor movement. Libet understood the readiness potential as the brain’s initiation of an unconscious decision, leading to the conscious awareness of the intention to act. This paper will argue that while Libet’s study provides evidence that unconscious neural processes may precede conscious awareness of certain decisions, his finding of the readiness potential does not adequately disprove free will.